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PREFACE
PUbLIC FINANCE IN POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS: A POLICy PAPER SERIES
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building a 
durable peace is building a state with the ability to collect 
and manage public resources. To implement peace 
accords and to provide public services, the government 
must be able to collect revenue, allocate resources, and 
manage expenditure in a manner that is regarded by its 
citizens as effective and equitable. 
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation, 
and expenditure management are bound together by 
political imperatives as well as economic logic. To collect 
revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate in the eyes 
of its citizens. and to secure legitimacy, the state must 
allocate resources and manage expenditure effectively 
and equitably. 
The need to build legitimate and capable states in war-
torn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles 
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, 
adopted by the development ministers of major donor 
countries in march 2005, declares that statebuilding is 
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break 
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of 
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as 
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now 
invoked as the solution. The policy rhetoric has changed 
from downsizing states to building state capacity. 
Yet little systematic work has been done on what the 
international community can and should do to strengthen 
the capacities of post-war states to mobilize, allocate, and 
spend public resources.  
This policy paper series, jointly published by the Center on 
International Cooperation (CIC) at new York University 
and the political economy research Institute (perI) at the 
University of massachusetts,  amherst, seeks to redress this 
gap by presenting innovative policy proposals targeting 
critical issues in postwar public finance. 
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to the 
success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons: 
First, governments must be able to ensure sustainable 
funding for new democratic institutions, for social 
programs that ease tensions and redress grievances, 
and for public investments to promote economic 
growth and development. In the early post-war years, 
•
countries often receive a large influx of external 
assistance that temporarily can meet some of these 
needs. But aid typically diminishes over time, so 
domestic resources are necessary to sustain these 
institutions and programs. a key challenge is to ensure 
that aid does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, 
but instead stimulates their growth.
second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a 
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in and 
of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. neither do 
‘quick impact projects’ in which international aid 
agencies seek to fill urgent needs. legitimacy comes 
in large part from government delivery of services that 
people need and want. elections provide an avenue for 
the citizenry to voice demands; responding to those 
demands requires the capacity to mobilize, allocate, 
and spend public resources effectively.
Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extra-
legal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as 
to enhance security. In afghanistan, for example, 
control of border customs outposts is not only a fiscal 
issue but also a security issue. similarly, control over 
revenues from natural-resource extraction, such as 
logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West africa, is 
often crucial for establishing the state’s monopoly not 
only in legitimate taxation but also in legitimate force. 
at the same time, domestic fiscal capacity is the only 
sustainable source of financing for public security after 
external peacekeepers have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed 
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding. The 
authors draw on extensive personal experience in public 
finance matters in war-torn societies, and on lessons 
from comparative studies, including Peace and the 
Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar Statebuilding 
(Boulder: lynne rienner, 2007), the outcome of the first 
stage of the CIC’s statebuilding project.  after a concise 
recapitulation of the problems to be addressed, the 
authors concentrate on proposing solutions that can be 
practically implemented. 
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience 
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult 
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the 
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks 
of building legitimate and effective states and building a 
durable peace. 
James K. BoYCe 
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
•
•
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REVENUE GENERATION 
IN POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARy
This paper advances five proposals for policies 
to improve revenue generation in post-conflict 
environments. In the aftermath of violent conflict 
there often is a gap between demands for the 
restoration of basic public goods and services, 
including jobs and security, and governmental 
capacity to generate revenue to meet these pressing 
needs. Improved revenue generation is a key task 
for building both a sustainable state and a durable 
peace.
CURRENT REVENUE-GENERATION POLICIES
revenue generation depends primarily on three 
elements: tax policy, the revenue administration 
system and overall economic activity. each of these 
elements is adversely affected by conflict. The 
challenge is exacerbated by weak state capacities for 
reform pressures from the international community 
to increase revenue so as to reduce dependence on 
external assistance and international policies that 
actually undermine revenue collection. 
revenue systems in low-income countries are 
more dependent on indirect taxation than those in 
industrialized countries. policies to increase revenue 
therefore have focused on improving collections 
from indirect taxes, notably trade taxes. efforts have 
also been made to introduce direct taxes on wages 
and business income to lay the foundation for a 
transition to greater reliance on these in later years. 
measures to improve revenue administration 
have focused on establishing basic infrastructure, 
developing information-management systems, 
strengthening customs administration, and creating 
large-taxpayer units that concentrate on the relatively 
small number of taxpayers likely to have the largest 
tax bills.
FIVE PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE REVENUE 
GENERATION
1. DONORS SHOULD ENTER INTO A MULTI-yEAR 
COMPACT TO PROVIDE MATCHING FUNDS FOR 
DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT.
linking budget-support aid to the amount of 
revenue collected will strengthen the incentive for 
the government to collect revenue, provide more 
predictable financing, free domestic leadership to 
focus on administrative reforms, and facilitate more 
effective cash management. a matching trust fund 
for this purpose can be part of a broader compact 
between the international community and the 
government. an open and transparent compact of 
this nature would set a good example for the dealings 
of the post-conflict government with its citizens 
more generally.
2. EXPLICITLy RECONSIDER HOw THE 
CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS INTERPRETED 
AND CLEARLy DELIMIT THE EXTENT OF TAX 
EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION.
The Convention on privileges and Immunities of 
the United nations was crafted 60 years ago, and 
many of its provisions have been extended to the 
international community more broadly. These 
provisions were designed before the advent of today’s 
complex and multi-dimensional peace operations. 
There is need for a systematic reinterpretation of the 
convention regarding the extent of exemptions for 
United nations missions and, by extension, bilateral 
missions, international agencies, and mission affiliates 
(international and local contractors) from local taxes, 
fees, and user charges.
3. REMOVE EXEMPTIONS ON PERSONAL INCOME 
TAX FOR FOREIGN CONTRACTORS AND THEIR 
FOREIGN EMPLOyEES wHEN DOUbLE TAXATION 
AGREEMENTS OR SIMILAR PROVISIONS ARE 
IN PLACE. wHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH 
AGREEMENTS, wORk TO INTRODUCE THEM.
a significant area of confusion involves the tax 
liabilities of foreign contractors and their foreign 
staff when there are double-taxation agreements 
or similar provisions. Granting a tax exemption in 
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these situations simply reduces the tax paid in the 
post-conflict country while increasing the tax paid 
in the home country. When foreign contractors and 
their foreign employees are following the laws of 
both their home jurisdiction and the post-conflict 
jurisdiction, then on financial grounds they should be 
indifferent to whether they receive a tax exemption 
or not. moreover, the cost of the aid project will be 
unchanged, because the net return to the law-abiding 
contractor or employee will be unchanged by the 
removal of the tax exemptions.
4. wHERE DONOR COUNTRIES PROVIDE 
bUDGET SUPPORT, REMOVE THEIR 
CONTRACTORS’ TAX EXEMPTIONS AND REDUCE 
DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT COMMENSURATE 
wITH THE TAXES PAID.
Tax exemptions for contractors and their employees 
create excessive complexity, undermine the integrity 
of the revenue system, hamper the development of 
local businesses,   and deprive the state of an important 
potential source of revenue in a time of few options. 
removing these exemptions and counting taxes paid 
by contractors toward budget-support aid would 
help to build the revenue administration system 
and would have positive demonstration effects. This 
would not change the total amount of aid provided, 
but simply alter the way it is provided to help build 
the state’s revenue-generation capacity.
5. INTRODUCE A TAX ON LAND HOLDING IN  
URbAN AREAS.
land taxation is relatively easy to administer and 
relatively hard to evade. such a tax can be based 
on value or simply on size. The focus should be on 
urban land for reasons of both scarce administrative 
capacity and social equity. The fact that the tenure 
of the land is often in dispute in post-conflict 
environments can actually facilitate introduction of a 
land taxation system, since the power of landowners 
in established political systems is less fractured. 
people making claims on disputed land would do so 
understanding that a successful claim brings with it 
a tax liability. 
CONCLUSIONS
post-conflict revenue authorities face a twin 
challenge – to generate increased domestic revenue 
to meet pressing needs and to build a system for 
sustainable revenue mobilization in the future. If 
the international community can more effectively 
support these tasks, the stability and fiscal 
sustainability of post-conflict states will increase.  
a useful step in this direction would be to convene 
a meeting of interested participants to consider the 
taxation treatment of the international community 
in the broader development context. This could 
be organized under the auspices of the oeCD’s 
Development assistance Committee, the Un 
peacebuilding Commission, or the ImF. In a calm 
environment, the detrimental impacts of tax 
exemptions can be considered and informed 
choices made to reach a consistent interpretation 
of these issues. In the course of these discussions, 
other proposals presented in this paper, including 
the topics of double-taxation agreements and the 
provision of budget support, can also be considered. 
a package of policy options could then be put 
together that would strengthen the capacity of 
revenue authorities to do their job in raising the 
resources necessary to meet the urgent spending 
needs of post-conflict societies.  
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REVENUE GENERATION 
IN POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS 
MICHAEL CARNAHAN*
Three key elements determine the effectiveness 
of revenue generation in any state: policies that 
determine the rates of taxation; the things that are 
taxable and the things that are exempt; the revenue 
administration system, which is the way in which 
the policies are implemented and revenue is actually 
collected; and the extent of economic activity, 
the things that can be taxed. In a post-conflict 
environment each of these elements has been 
adversely affected. 
These difficulties are compounded by three 
additional factors. First, the capacity of the state to 
reform its policies and its institutions is weak, so 
progress is likely to be slow and difficult. second, 
there is pressure from the international community 
to increase domestic revenue collection to reduce 
reliance on external budget support. Finally, while 
this pressure can, and has been used by some 
domestic leaders to push for needed reforms, the 
policies adopted by the international community 
in their own operations often undermine revenue 
collection and the building 
of a sustainable revenue 
collection system. 
There is an intimate link 
between an effective system 
of public finance and other 
dimensions of statebuilding. 
The use of domestic revenue to fund essential 
public goods such as health, education and basic 
infrastructure is at the heart of the social contract 
between the citizen and the state.  In the absence 
of broad political support for the administration and 
acceptance of its legitimacy, there will be so much 
willful non-compliance with tax policies that even 
draconian enforcement efforts will yield very limited 
revenues. Without a functioning security sector, 
the enforcement and compliance activities needed 
to operate a revenue system will be inadequate. 
moreover, in the absence of revenue collection the 
security sectors will look to finance themselves 
through unofficial means. 
This paper examines options for revenue generation 
in a post-conflict environment. It begins with a 
short summary of the elements and goals of a 
revenue system, a brief comparison of revenue 
collection across different groups of countries, and 
a review of the policies and reforms that have been 
implemented in recent post-conflict environments 
to enhance revenue collection. against this setting, 
the remainder of the paper outlines three specific 
ways in which revenue collection could be 
enhanced and a sustainable revenue system could 
be built: by providing direct incentives through 
budget support for enhanced revenue collection, 
by restructuring the taxation treatment of the 
international community, and by focusing on land 
taxation in the post-conflict setting. 
wHAT IS A REVENUE SySTEM  
AND wHAT SHOULD IT DO? 
Governments raise revenues so that they can spend 
the money to fund the provision of public goods 
such as law and order, public health, and education1. 
In designing a revenue system the most important 
consideration is ensuring that there is adequate 
revenue to meet these essential needs. a range of 
other factors is considered 
desirable. The system 
should be simple so that 
the administrative cost and 
the cost of compliance to 
citizens are low. simplicity 
and transparency also 
reduce corruption and make tax avoidance more 
difficult. The revenue system should also be 
economically neutral in that it should not favor one 
activity over another – this is regularly referred to as 
*michael Carnahan is a visiting fellow at the Crawford school of economics 
and Government, australian national University. he served as senior adviser 
to the minister of Finance in afghanistan in 2002–04, and as director of the 
Budget office in the east Timor Transitional administration in 2000–01. he 
has also worked in the Departments of Treasury and Finance in the australian 
Government.
1/  For a longer and more general discussion see, for example, nicholas stern,  
“aspects of the General Theory of Taxation,” in n. stern and D. newbery eds.  
The Theory of Taxation in Developing Countries (new York: oxford University 
press, 1987). 
The use of domestic revenue to fund 
essential public goods such as health, 
education and basic infrastructure 
is at the heart of the social contract 
between the citizen and the state. 
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having a broad base (i.e. tax all economic activities) 
with a low rate. Whenever any economic activity 
is exempted from taxes it means that all remaining 
activities must be taxed at a higher rate in order to 
collect the same amount of revenue. 
The government must have the capacity to estimate 
the amount of revenue that will be collected under 
the existing legislation, enact legislative changes 
if this revenue needs to be increased, and then 
administer the revenue system to ensure that 
the revenue is actually collected. estimating the 
available revenue involves analyzing the collections 
data from previous years, estimating changes in 
major macroeconomic parameters (such as GDp 
and inflation) and then estimating the likely impact 
on revenue collections. 
There are four key elements in taxation 
administration: registering and accounting for 
payments from taxpayers; annual assessments 
and reconciliation of amounts paid by taxpayers 
with overall obligations; taxpayer education and 
enforcement, which generally focuses on large 
taxpayers; and an active program of audits and 
court-based prosecutions. Customs administration 
also involves valuation of goods, determining 
eligibility for exemption, controls of import quotas, 
and physically examining goods. 
THE CONTEXT: REVENUE COLLECTIONS  
IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
The experiences of revenue collection in post-
conflict and developed countries are very different. 
on average,  revenue systems in low-income countries 
tap a much lower share of economic activity than in 
higher-income countries, and post-conflict countries 
are often below the low-income country average. 
Figure 1 presents the level of revenue in relation to 
GDp in the eU, oeCD, low-income countries, and 
select post-conflict countries.2
2/  Timor-leste is an exception because of oil and gas revenues, but other revenue 
in the country is less than nine percent of GDp.
FIGURE 1: REVENUE/GDP 
source:  Data for oeCD and eU are from OECD in Figures, 2005; aggregate 
low-income country data are from World Bank World Development Indicators 
database; country data are from ImF article IV consultation reports or 
statistical annexes. all refer to most recent year for which data are available.
a second feature is the balance between indirect and 
direct taxation. Indirect taxation (that is taxation of 
goods and services), including trade taxes, services 
taxes and consumption taxes, generally requires 
a lower level of administrative capacity than 
direct taxation (that is taxation of income), which 
includes personal and company income taxation.  In 
developed economies around 60 percent of revenue 
is collected from direct taxation, with less than a 
third from indirect taxation (and the remainder 
from non-tax revenues). In post-conflict countries 
these figures typically are reversed with around half 
(and in some cases considerably more) coming from 
indirect taxes and less than a third coming from 
direct taxes. This also reflects the fact that in many 
post-conflict economies the formal sector (on which 
income taxes could be levied) is relatively small, 
with much of the population engaged in subsistence 
agriculture. Figure 2 highlights the comparatively 
high reliance of post-conflict countries on trade 
taxes, a subset of indirect taxes.
FIGURE 2: TRADE TAXES AS % OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE
source: ImF article IV reports for sierra leone, liberia and DrC; other 
figures from K. Fukasaku, Fiscal Impact of Trade Liberalization: A Review 
of Recent  Country Experiences in Africa, oeCD Development Centre.
RECENT EFFORTS TO INCREASE  
REVENUE IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
efforts to support the mobilization of domestic 
revenue have been undertaken in most post-conflict 
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environments. This section presents a summary of 
the most common approaches taken.  The efforts 
involve both trying to improve the policy environment 
and trying to improve administrative capacity. 
IMPROVING REVENUE POLICIES
The first area of focus has been on improving 
revenue collections from indirect taxes, particularly 
taxes collected at the borders. major reforms have 
focused on simplification of the number of tariff 
rates, number of classifications, and extent of 
exemptions. In afghanistan, for example, 25 tariff 
rates that ranged from seven to 150 percent were 
replaced with a simplified six-rate structure.4 
a second way in which revenue collections from 
border taxes have been enhanced is through 
improved exchange rate policies. In many 
post-conflict countries the exchange rate used to 
value goods for customs purposes is artificial. In 
afghanistan, where the real exchange rate was 
around 40 afghanis to the Us dollar, at the border an 
artificial rate of 4.5 afghanis to the dollar was used. 
By virtue of the resulting undervaluation of imports, 
the effective duty collected was around one-tenth of 
the nominal tariff. moreover, border posts engaged 
in de facto competition by offering even more 
attractive exchange rates. moving to the market 
exchange rate for valuation purposes was a critical 
part of the overall customs reform package. similarly, 
in lebanon and rwanda a key ImF recommendation 
was the alignment of the customs exchange rate 
with the market rate. 
as a short-term measure, a tax on exports also 
has been proposed in some countries such as 
liberia, Timor-leste, and Tajikistan. In general, this 
has been proposed in situations where one or two 
commodities constituted the bulk of the exports 
and production in these areas was rapidly restored 
/  Within the international development community primary responsibility for 
supporting post-conflict countries in developing their revenue-raising capabilities lies 
with the International monetary Fund. This section of the paper draws on “rebuilding 
Fiscal Institutions in post-Conflict Countries” prepared by the ImF’s Fiscal affairs 
Division, December 2004 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2005/022505.pdf).
4/  For a more detailed discussion of the reforms in afghanistan, see “Fiscal 
management in afghanistan: major achievements and Current Challenges” in 
m. Carnahan and n. manning, reforming Fiscal and economic management 
in afghanistan (World Bank, 2004). In august 2006, the six-rate structure was 
expanded to a ten-rate structure.
after the conflict. While there were concerns over 
the distortionary impacts of such a tax, including 
discouraging investment in export sectors with 
associated risks to the balance of payments, such 
taxes were seen as necessary in the aftermath of the 
conflict – when there were few other options. When 
the capacity to introduce a broader income tax, 
including on the incomes of exporters, is in place, 
the export tax can be removed. In Timor-leste, for 
example, a tax on the export of coffee was put in 
place in the immediate post-conflict period to raise 
revenue, but it was removed when a general income 
tax was implemented. 
In many cases, taxes on services consumed 
predominantly by expatriates (restaurants, hotels, 
and telecoms) have been proposed. For example in 
Kosovo and Timor-leste, a services tax of 10 percent 
was imposed on these three items. Vehicle rentals 
were also taxed in Timor-leste.  a turnover threshold 
ensured that businesses catering for local customers 
were exempt. The small number of businesses 
servicing the international community provides an 
easily identifiable tax base. This is one way in which 
the international community has been taxed. This 
helps lay a foundation for a broader consumption 
tax when the administrative capacity can support 
broadening of the base. 
on the direct taxation side, in most countries 
some form of income taxation was proposed, 
even though such taxes are more difficult to 
administer. The major reason for introducing them 
early is the political difficulties associated with 
introducing them at a later stage when people are 
not accustomed to paying income tax. Where there 
was an existing income-tax regime, in countries such 
as Cambodia, lebanon, and Tajikistan, recommended 
reforms included harmonizing and reducing tax 
rates to increase compliance and base-broadening 
through the removal of exemptions. a common 
form of income tax in the early post-conflict period 
has been a flat withholding tax on wages (e.g., 
in albania, Bosnia and herzegovina, and Kosovo), 
which is relatively easy to administer in a formal 
workforce dominated by civil servants and 
international organizations. 
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a range of measures also have been proposed 
for taxing business income. These included 
presumptive taxes on income for small businesses in 
Timor-leste and Kosovo, based on factors including 
the type of product sold, the size of the enterprise, 
and a rough estimate of turnover. The revenue yield 
from these taxes was not anticipated to be high 
initially. however, again there is an imperative to 
introduce a tax system to encourage a culture of 
compliance from the start – especially in sectors 
expected to grow. 
IMPROVING REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
several measures have been undertaken to restore 
revenue administration in post-conflict contexts. 
The first priority typically is to establish the 
basic infrastructure for a functioning revenue 
administration, including buildings and equipment. 
In new countries or territories such as Timor-leste, 
Kosovo, or Bosnia and herzegovina, the requirements 
included physically sound buildings, telephone lines, 
and vehicles. another key piece of infrastructure was 
a basic information management system able 
to produce revenue statistics and monitor operations. 
The second step was the appointment of essential 
senior staff. 
operationally, the first step 
involves registration and 
identification of taxpayers. 
In many cases (e.g., liberia, 
serbia and montenegro, 
Kosovo, rwanda, Timor-
leste) this involved registering each taxpayer with a 
unique taxpayer identification number. This number 
was the basis for filing returns and cross-checking 
data. administration was also improved by simplifying 
the procedures through which tax returns were filed, 
or instituting simple procedures in the case of new 
administrations. 
an initial focus of domestic authorities in many 
post-conflict countries (e.g., Kosovo, Timor-leste, 
afghanistan), with international support, has been 
strengthening the customs administration, 
reflecting the need to increase actual revenue 
collections as rapidly as possible. maintaining the focus 
on high-yielding areas of administration, the authorities, 
again with international support, also have created 
large-taxpayer units, concentrating on the relatively 
small number of taxpayers who are likely to have the 
largest tax bills. establishing these units has often been 
challenging because of the lack of a qualified pool of 
tax officials to effectively audit large taxpayers. 
These efforts to improve revenue collection 
performance in post-conflict environments have 
achieved considerable incremental progress in many 
of the countries mentioned above. however, these 
reforms alone have rarely been successful in rapidly 
placing post-conflict states on a path to fiscal self-
sufficiency—a critical determinant for sovereignty.
one reason is that they have failed to confront some 
of the key challenges created by the international 
system, discussed below. 
THREE NEw OPTIONS TO ENHANCE 
REVENUE GENERATION
The remainder of this paper advances three specific 
options to enhance revenue generation in post-conflict 
countries. The first option would alter the way that 
existing budget support is provided so as to create a 
direct incentive for domestic policy-makers to improve 
revenue policies and 
administration. The second 
option is to revisit policies 
around the taxation of the 
international community 
in post-conflict countries, 
with a focus on building 
the capacity of the revenue administration system, 
not simply to raise revenues. The final option is to 
increase land taxation, on the grounds that during post-
war economic recovery taxing stocks of assets may be 
preferable to trying to tax limited flows of economic 
activity. 
1. CHANGE THE wAy bUDGET SUPPORT 
IS PROVIDED by DONORS
The first option for enhancing domestic revenue 
generation is to introduce a modality where budget 
support is provided to post-conflict countries 
through a matching funds formula.5
5/  This discussion only focuses on the external assistance that is pledged to 
recipient countries in the form of budget support, generally through multilateral 
trust funds. In general, a far greater portion of funds are routed around the 
government through a parallel external public sector.
however, these reforms alone have 
rarely been successful in rapidly 
placing post-conflict states on a path 
to fiscal self-sufficiency—a critical 
determinant for sovereignty.
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This approach sharpens the government’s incentive 
to raise domestic revenue and to manage expenditure 
responsibly. From a broader state-building 
perspective it also introduces more predictable 
financing, frees up the time of the domestic 
leadership to focus on reforms, and allows for far 
more effective cash management. These support the 
more effective operation of the state, and through 
this the provision of a stronger enabling environment 
for the private sector. The associated growth then 
provides a stronger revenue base going forward.  
Immediately after conflict, countries find themselves 
with a weak revenue system and a weak economy 
and are rarely able to fund the basic operations of 
the state – such as paying salaries. often domestic 
revenues cover less than half of routine operating 
expenses.6  The remainder of the funds are provided 
by donor countries in the 
form of budget support. 
Budget support is often 
managed through a 
multilateral trust fund with 
an international agency 
as the trustee, such as the 
afghanistan reconstruction 
Trust Fund (arTF – World 
Bank as trustee) or the law and order Trust Fund 
for afghanistan (loTFa – UnDp as trustee), or the 
UnTaeT Consolidated Fund for east Timor (CFeT – 
Un as trustee). In some cases budget support is also 
provided as direct bilateral assistance. What happens 
in practice is that the domestic authorities prepare a 
budget outlining a proposed spending program and 
identify a financing gap. The budget and financing 
gap are presented at a donor meeting, where donors 
pledge – with varying degrees of commitment – to 
meet the financing gap. over the course of the next 
year, the finance minister and their colleagues spend 
a considerable amount of time trying to translate the 
pledges of donors into actual cash disbursements in 
a timely enough fashion to meet the ongoing cash 
needs of the government’s operations.7  
6/   For example in the case of Timor-leste for the first two post-conflict years,  
domestic revenue covered 7 percent of operating expenditure, while in 
afghanistan the figure was 4 percent.
7/  The examples here are built on the author’s experience as the director of the 
Budget office, Central Fiscal authority, in Timor-leste and senior adviser to the 
afghan minister of Finance. The situation is similar in many other post-conflict 
There are several negative consequences of this 
modality of supporting the operation of the post-
conflict government. First, the incentive for the 
government to actually raise revenue is diminished. 
Taxing people is an unpopular task for any 
government. In a post-conflict environment with an 
inexperienced cabinet, the notion of raising tax rates 
or introducing new taxes to raise revenue is a very 
hard sell. Donors are seen as a much softer touch, and 
so difficult decisions to raise revenue are not taken. 
The second problem with the provision of budget 
support in this way is that the opportunity is lost 
to build the capacity of the new government to 
handle the difficult macro-level expenditure-revenue 
trade-offs, or even the trade-offs among competing 
expenditure priorities. In most governments, the 
level of expenditure is set largely by the amount 
of revenue that can be 
raised. In the post-conflict 
environment, the trade-off 
between raising taxes or 
reducing expenditure is 
lost when opportunistic 
ministers simply argue 
that spending should be 
increased – so the budget 
becomes a wish list presented to donors, not a tool 
that prioritizes across competing needs. Donors 
will not explicitly say no; they just won’t contribute. 
Thus, unnecessary uncertainty is introduced into the 
budget process. 
The third problem is the impact of the uncertainty 
associated with donor pledges and contributions on 
the cash-management task during budget execution. 
In a post-conflict country there is rarely any scope for 
borrowing to meet ongoing operational expenses. 
In this environment, the ability to effectively 
manage the cash of the government is critical. The 
uncertainty surrounding the timing and arrival of 
donor pledges into budget support trust funds means 
that predictable budget execution is not possible. 
environments. For discussion, see s. Forman and s. patrick, eds., Good Intentions: 
Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery (Boulder: lynne rienner, 2000). 
The trade-off between raising taxes 
or reducing expenditure is lost when 
opportunistic ministers simply argue 
that spending should be increased 
– so the budget becomes a wish list 
presented to donors, not a tool that 
prioritizes across competing needs. 
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PROPOSAL 1: DONORS ENTER INTO A  
MULTI-yEAR COMPACT wITH THE HOST 
GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE MATCHING FUNDS 
FOR DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT PURPOSES. 
To address these concerns, donors could agree to 
match a percentage of the funds collected by the 
host government up to a fixed limit. The matching 
percentage could be reduced over time, reflecting 
the increasing capacity of 
the host government to raise 
revenue, and the expected 
increase in economic activity 
and therefore the tax base. 
an example is presented in 
the table below. 
EXAMPLE OF MATCHING FUNDS FOR bUDGET SUPPORT
Years Domestic 
Revenue
Matching 
%
Donor 
Contribution
Total 
Budget
1 100 200% 200 300
2 150 150% 225 375
3 200 100% 200 400
4 250 75% 187 437
5 300 50% 150 450
6 400 25% 100 500
7 500 20% 100 600
In the first couple of post-conflict years, donors 
commit to significantly higher levels of budget 
support as a percentage of domestic revenue, 
reflecting both the lower domestic capacity to 
raise and spend, and the importance of providing 
strong incentives for domestic policymakers to 
take responsible taxation decisions. operationally, 
the likely levels of domestic revenues, and the sorts 
of levels that would constitute appropriate stretch 
targets, could be agreed upon by ImF officials and 
donors. 
In practice, the system would involve the creation 
of a trust fund into which donors would make 
contributions. The details of the agreement 
establishing the trust would specify its operations, 
but the simplest operation would involve monthly 
certification of the changes, in the balance of the 
ministry of finance general revenue account at the 
central bank by an independent authority and then, 
based on these changes the automatic disbursement 
from the trust fund of the agreed amount into the 
revenue account.
The creation of this system would provide an impetus 
for a number of essential improvements in the public 
finance architecture in the 
post-conflict environment. 
The primary advantage is that 
it places the incentive fairly 
and squarely on domestic 
authorities to make responsible decisions in relation 
to domestic revenue mobilization. rather than the 
crowding-out effect of traditional budget support, the 
matching funds approach has a crowding-in effect, 
heightening the incentive for revenue collection. In 
the early post-conflict years, recipient governments 
would know that each additional dollar of revenue 
that they raise actually provides them with an extra 
two or three dollars for domestic spending. In this 
way the domestic demand for revenue-enhancing 
reforms – the critical ingredient for their success – is 
heightened. moreover, a matching-funds approach 
sharpens the link between revenue raising and 
increasing expenditure, provides much greater 
certainty to facilitate building stronger cash-flow 
skills in the treasury, and reduces the drain on the 
time now spent by the finance minister and senior 
officials in chasing donors to turn pledges into 
disbursements. 
The major challenge of such an approach involves 
the preparedness of donors to make their aid flows 
predictable and reliable – putting into practice 
agreements on good donor practices made in such 
statements as the 2005 paris Declaration8  or the 
DaC principles for Good International engagement 
in Fragile states9.  The provision of funds in this way 
8/ The paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 march 2005, is an international agreement 
in which over 100 ministers, heads of agencies and other senior officials 
committed their countries and organizations to continue and increase their 
efforts on harmonization, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of 
monitorable actions and indicators.  
see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/442851.pdf.
9/ These principles were prepared following discussions at the January 2005 
oeCD senior level Forum on Development effectiveness in Fragile states to 
build on the growing consensus about aid effectiveness.  
see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/4700989.pdf. 
The major challenge of such an 
approach involves the preparedness 
of donors to make their aid flows 
predictable and reliable. 
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requires a greater degree of planning and discipline 
in donor operations than has been demonstrated in 
post-conflict environments to date. While a matching 
funds approach removes the opportunity to use 
individual budget contributions as a direct incentive 
to micro-manage the post-conflict government, a 
matching trust fund can be part of a broader compact 
between the international community and the 
post-conflict government. an open and transparent 
compact of this nature sets a good example for the 
dealings of the post-conflict government with its 
citizens more generally. 
2. TAXATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITy
In any post-conflict setting, the operations of the 
international community, including the emergency 
and humanitarian activities, reconstruction 
activities, and the general level of economic 
activity associated with an increased international 
presence, represent a large share of the economic 
activity. Where subsistence agriculture represents 
another large share of the economy, the activities 
of the international community represent an even 
larger share of the formal economy. In its report 
on “rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in post-Conflict 
Countries,” the ImF notes: 
most post-conflict countries experienced a large influx of 
expatriates in connection with relief and reconstruction work. 
In general these incomes were exempt from taxation. The 
differential treatment of expatriates risked creating a culture of 
tax exemptions and made it more difficult to implement a simple 
tax system where all taxpayers faced a level playing field.10  
Taxing the activities of the international community 
is a very emotive issue, with passionate views held 
by many stakeholders. It is also an area where 
there is a considerable degree of confusion and 
misunderstanding. The discussion that follows is 
intended to address some of these misunderstandings 
and clear up some of the confusion. The first part 
provides some background on the privileges and 
immunities enjoyed by the United nations – which 
are generally used by other international players 
as a benchmark for their own concessions. The 
10/ ImF FaD op cit, para 44. 
consequences of administering these exemptions in 
the post-conflict setting are then examined. Foregone 
revenue is one concern, but a bigger concern is 
the damage that is done to the fragile revenue 
administration and the lost opportunity to build a 
more robust system. The third part addresses some 
of the most common objections raised by those 
opposed to paying taxes. The final part presents 
some concrete ways to support revenue generation 
from the international community. 
bACkGROUND
In dealing with revenue authorities in host 
countries, the international community regularly 
situates its arguments within the Convention on the 
privileges and Immunities of the United nations.11 
The convention provides a clear set of immunities 
to the United nations and its staff. The United 
nations is exempt from all direct taxes (such as 
income taxes), but will not claim exemptions from 
charges for use of public utilities (section 7a). It is 
exempt from customs duties (section 7b), but will 
not as a rule claim exemption from excise duties 
(section 8). International Un staff shall be exempt 
from taxation on their salaries (section 18b) and 
have the right to import their furniture and effects 
free of duty when first taking up their posting, but 
they are not exempt from customs or excise duties 
on other goods imported for personal consumption. 
The convention makes no reference to the taxation 
treatment of national staff or contractors to the 
United nations, nor does it refer to the Un’s system 
of “staff assessment.”12  
When the Un mission is operating in a country with a 
sovereign government, a further set of privileges and 
11/  The Convention on the privileges and Immunities of the United nations was 
adopted by the General assembly on 1 February 1946. most, if not all, bilateral 
agencies include a clause in their country agreements that guarantees them 
privileges and immunities that are “no less than” those enjoyed by the United 
nations. hence the focus here is on the convention.
12/ staff assessment is sometimes characterized as a form of internal “tax” 
administered by the United nations. Un staff salaries are expressed in gross 
and net amounts. The difference (the assessment) is not paid like a regular tax. 
rather it is deposited into the Un’s Tax equalization Fund, the purpose of which 
is to ensure horizontal equity for those employees who are liable to pay income 
tax because they are citizens of the handful of countries that have not signed 
the convention. The fund is used to offset tax payments by these employees 
and to offset financial obligations to support United nations operations for 
those countries that are signatories to the convention. In effect, signatories pay 
lower Un dues while non-signatories pay higher dues and their citizens are 
compensated for being subject to income taxation. 
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immunities are contained in the agreement between 
the host government and the Un that establishes 
the mission. a model status of forces agreement 
(soFa) presented to the General assembly in 1990 
(a/45/594) has been the basis for many of these 
agreements. This model confirms the convention 
but also extends it to add several other immunities, 
including the right to establish a commissary which 
can import goods free of duty for resale to members 
of the peacekeeping operation and the right to 
purchase goods and services 
locally free from sales taxes. It 
also obliges the government 
to provide accommodation 
to the mission free of charge; 
to provide water, electricity, 
and other utilities free of 
charge or at the most favorable rate; and to grant 
locally recruited staff immunity from taxation.1 
The taxation treatment of contractors or their staff 
again is not covered. In afghanistan the model was 
extended specifically to grant tax exemptions to Un 
contractors, other than local contractors.
The model soFa thus establishes greater concessions 
than are included in the original convention. Country-
specific agreements are generally negotiated to 
maximize the extent of exemptions and concessions. 
a real concern is that the host government finds itself 
in a very weak position, needing the peacekeeping 
mission to establish basic 
security, and so it is prepared 
to agree to whatever 
conditions are presented.14 
When there is no host 
government, as in Timor- 
leste or Kosovo, there is even less 
counterbalancing force to limit the immunities. 
1/ There are, of course, anomalies in the application of even such routine 
requirements. For example, in sierra leone, the government had previously leased 
the building most suitable for Un mission headquarters to a private party, who 
was not bound by security Council requirements and whom the mission then 
paid to sub-lease the building. In the absence of the government’s initial lease, 
the mission would have occupied the building rent-free. Under the prevailing 
arrangement, however, the government received both rent and taxes from its 
lessee, and the Un’s sub-lease covered both.
14/   see, for example, m. de Brito, The relationship between peacekeepers, host 
Governments and the local population, monograph 10, Conflict management, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, United nations research Institute for social 
Development (www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs), for comments on the 
negotiations between the mozambican Government and onUmoZ.
CONSEqUENCES 
Tax exemptions have several negative consequences 
for the host economy. They directly reduce the 
state’s revenue – because taxes are not paid. Indeed, 
given that the major economic activity in the early 
years of post-conflict recovery revolves around the 
international community, exemptions of this nature 
remove the major potential source of revenue. even 
more problematic, however, is the damage caused to 
the integrity of the revenue 
administration system. In 
situations where missions 
have been deployed, 
administrative capacity is 
generally very low and the 
bureaucracy is often poorly 
paid and corrupt. In building an administrative 
system that can work, there is an absolute premium 
on both simplicity and removing discretion. 
Concessions of this nature add an administrative 
burden and an additional layer of complexity to an 
already weak system. In doing this, they seriously 
undermine the chances of building a revenue system 
that can operate on a sustainable basis. 
The complexity in the system is exacerbated by 
the blurred lines in regard to exemptions. There are 
relatively few who argue that international staff of 
Un missions, or international staff in donor agencies, 
should be liable for host-
country tax on the income 
they earn. however, as the 
funds move further and 
further into and through the 
economy, there is a question 
of when the exemption 
should be stopped.  should a contractor to a donor 
organization be liable for tax? should the foreign 
employees of the contractor, or the local employees 
of the contractor, or the local employees of a sub-
contractor? should staff be exempt from indirect tax 
as well as direct tax?
This complexity is illustrated in the appendix Table 
which lists the different rules that currently apply 
to different entities in Kosovo. Tax liabilities vary for 
different organizations. They vary for depending on 
The host government finds itself in 
a very weak position, needing the 
peacekeeping mission to establish basic 
security, and so it is prepared to agree 
to whatever conditions are presented.
should a contractor to a donor 
organization be liable for tax? should the 
foreign employees of the contractor, or 
the local employees of the contractor, or 
the local employees of a sub-contractor?
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which organization they work for and on whether 
they are international or local staff.   They vary for the 
contractors of different organizations, and again for 
the employees of different contractors to different 
organizations, again depending on the organization 
and whether the contractor and the employee 
are local or international. a revenue authority in 
a developed country would be criticized for this 
level of complexity. a revenue authority in a post-
conflict country that allocates its scarce resources to 
managing this complexity will not be able to build a 
strong administrative structure. 
The integrity of the revenue system is also damaged 
by the demonstration effect of the exemptions. In a 
weak system, compliance is a particular challenge—
especially when the court system that is needed for 
enforcement is also weak. The attitude of trying to 
minimize taxation,  rather than seeing revenue collection 
as a necessary state function, is adopted by others in 
the economy. In regard to user-charge collections, 
for example, compliance by private businesses is 
compromised when the major users (foreign missions) 
claim exemptions.
Finally, the tax exemptions to the international 
community hamper the development of local 
businesses. merchants selling imported goods on 
which duty has been paid cannot compete with goods 
sold in the commissary, or with goods that have been 
imported duty-free for the international community and 
then sold privately—so these policies have the effect 
of favoring dishonest businesses over honest ones. 
similarly, exemptions for international contractors give 
them a competitive edge over local contractors who 
have to pay tax, again hampering the development of 
the legitimate domestic private sector. 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE 
OF EXEMPTIONS
The major argument for the maintenance of 
exemptions is more ideological than logical: “We 
are the international community, here to help 
the country,  and we don’t pay tax.”15  It is partly 
15/  a clear example is the response of the international community when a tax 
on rental income was introduced in afghanistan. many of the most expensive 
houses in Kabul are rented by members of the international community: missions, 
their contractors, international nGos, or international staff. The income that 
landowners earn from renting their land or properties out to foreigners is 
taxable income. The Finance ministry tried to introduce a withholding regime to 
explained by the fact that many international 
organizations see themselves fundamentally as 
operating outside of – and in a sense, above – the 
state. many staff in international organizations do not 
understand the importance of raising revenue for the 
creation of a sustainable state, in some cases because 
their own resources come from voluntary fundraising 
appeals, not from revenue collection. moreover, the 
centrality of statebuilding to forging a durable peace 
and sustained poverty reduction remains contested 
by some. 
The second argument against taxing international 
organizations, or their contractors or staff, is that this 
will reduce the amount of money that is available 
to be spent on development projects. While often 
considered by the development community to be a 
self-evident truth, this issue needs to be considered 
more closely. It rests on an assumption that a dollar 
allocated to an aid project has a better development 
or poverty reduction impact than a dollar allocated 
to the government. This assumption needs to be 
tested empirically. There is considerable literature 
on the ineffectiveness of aid spending.16  In a situation 
where the government is allocating a large share 
of its funds to pro-poor development activities, 
such as teacher salaries or basic medicines, it is not 
immediately obvious that removing exemptions 
from international organizations will lead to less 
effective spending on development projects. 
a related assumption is that the government is 
inefficient or corrupt, or both. however, payment 
of taxes helps to solve this problem by motivating 
taxpayer pressure for improved government 
performance, and this pressure would be enhanced 
if the international community also paid taxes. 
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS 
The four proposals presented below are designed 
both to allow for the removal of tax exemptions and 
collect this revenue – that is, a system where the tenants withhold the income 
tax portion on behalf of the landowners and submit that money to the revenue 
authority – in the same way that employers withhold employees’ income tax 
in many countries. In most cases the international community simply refused 
to support this approach. They claimed that asking them to withhold the tax 
payments in this way represented a tax on them and in this way violated the 
Convention on privileges and Immunity. Yet legally the tax is clearly levied on the 
income of the landowner, not on the rent paid by the tenant. 
16/ see, for example, r. rajan and a. subramanian, “aid and Growth: What does the 
cross-country evidence really show us?” ImF Working paper Wp05/127, June 2005; 
and W. easterly, The White man’s Burden: Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest 
have Done so much Ill and so little Good, (penguin press, 2006). 
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to meet the concerns of the international community 
outlined above.
PROPOSAL 2: EXPLICITLy RECONSIDER HOw 
THE CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS 
INTERPRETED AND CLEARLy DELIMIT THE 
EXTENT OF TAX EXEMPTIONS UNDER 
THE CONVENTION.
There is need for a systematic reinterpretation of the 
Convention on the privileges and Immunities regarding 
the extent of exemptions for United nations missions 
and, by extension, bilateral missions, international 
agencies, and mission affiliates (international and local 
contractors) from local taxes, fees, and user charges. 
The convention was crafted 60 years ago in a very 
different environment from that in which the United 
nations now operates. Today there are many more 
peacekeeping missions (only a quarter of all missions 
commenced in the first 40 years of the Un), and 
peacekeeping missions have become more complex, 
involving a broader array of activities. at the very 
least, there needs to be a consistent position taken 
across all missions, but the re-interpretation should 
also be mindful of the expanded role that agencies 
of the international community play in the security, 
political development, and economic development of 
the territories where they operate. 
presently the same debates are rehashed every time 
a post-conflict reconstruction mission is established. 
The Un legal office had the same arguments with the 
revenue authority in Kosovo as it had with the east 
Timor revenue service. It had the same arguments 
with the ministry of Finance in afghanistan. This 
repetition is wasteful in both time and resources. 
What is needed instead is a broader dialogue, possibly 
through the new peacebuilding Commission of the 
Un, with involvement from the ImF and World Bank. 
This discussion needs to be held outside the cut and 
thrust of an individual post-conflict context. In this 
discussion, analysis of the broader consequences of 
the inconsistent and opportunistic application of the 
convention can be undertaken. Then the convention 
could be applied consistently in each new post-
conflict environment. 
PROPOSAL 3: REMOVE EXEMPTIONS ON 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX FOR FOREIGN 
CONTRACTORS AND THEIR FOREIGN 
EMPLOyEES wHEN DOUbLE TAXATION 
AGREEMENTS OR SIMILAR PROVISIONS ARE 
IN PLACE. wHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH 
AGREEMENTS, wORk TO INTRODUCE THEM. 
a significant area of confusion involves the tax 
liabilities of foreign contractors and their foreign staff 
when there are double-taxation agreements or similar 
provisions in place.  Consider the following example 
of a contractor who earns $100,000 for work in a 
post-conflict country.17 let the income tax rate in their 
home country be 0 percent, and the tax rate in the 
post-conflict country be 20 percent18.  The tax liability 
with and without the exemption is presented below: 
TOTAL TAX LIAbILITy FOR FOREIGN CONTRACTORS  
AND THEIR EMPLOyEES
With 
 exemption
Without 
exemption
1. Income 100,000 100,000
2. Tax paid in 
post-conflict 
country (at 20%)
0 20,000
3. Tax liability in 
home country 
(at 30%)
30,000 30,000
4. Tax credit for 
foreign tax paid
0 20,000
5. Actual tax 
paid in home 
country (=3-4)
30,000 10,000
6. Total tax paid 
(=2+5)
30,000 30,000
Granting a tax exemption in these situations simply 
reduces the tax paid in the post-conflict country while 
increasing the tax paid in the home country. When 
foreign contractors and their foreign employees are 
17/ This example applies equally to a contractor seeking a business-income 
or profit tax exemption and to the employee seeking a personal-income tax 
exemption.
18/ The marginal income tax rates in post-conflict countries have regularly been 
set well below the marginal income tax rates that apply in oeCD countries.
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following the laws of both their home jurisdiction 
and the post-conflict jurisdiction, then on financial 
grounds they should be indifferent to whether 
they receive a tax exemption or not. moreover, the 
cost of the aid project will be unchanged, because 
the net return to the law-abiding contractor or 
employee will be unchanged by the removal of the 
tax exemptions.
In the absence of double-taxation agreements, 
revenue authorities in donor jurisdictions may not 
recognize taxes paid to revenue authorities in post-
conflict countries as legitimate taxation payments. 
In this case, removing the tax exemption will indeed 
increase the costs of doing business. however, 
following on from proposal 2, supporting domestic 
revenue mobilization involves putting processes in 
place to ensure that the revenue authorities in the 
donor countries do recognize these payments as 
legitimate taxation payments. officials from the 
finance ministries and treasuries of donor countries 
regularly engage with the advisers and officials from 
the post-conflict ministries of finance and revenue 
authorities.  a valuable form of assistance would be 
if these officials from the donor countries worked 
with their colleagues at home to ensure that 
credit was given for tax paid in the post-conflict 
jurisdiction. In this way, the tax exemptions could 
be removed with less complaint. 
PROPOSAL 4: wHERE DONOR COUNTRIES 
PROVIDE bUDGET SUPPORT, REMOVE 
THEIR CONTRACTORS’ TAX EXEMPTIONS 
AND REDUCE DIRECT bUDGET SUPPORT 
COMMENSURATE wITH THE TAXES PAID. 
one of the ironies in post-conflict assistance is that 
donor countries stridently argue for tax exemptions 
for their contractors, claiming that development 
money shouldn’t just go straight into the post-conflict 
country’s treasury, yet at the same time they make 
contributions to a multilateral trust fund that makes 
payments into the post-conflict country’s treasury. 
The primary rationale cannot be fiscal as the funds 
are spent regardless. rather it is likely to be because 
the donor country wants to be able to demonstrate its 
generosity by publicly (and loudly) announcing every 
penny it provides in budget support. however, if the 
goal is genuinely to build a stable and sustainable state, 
then those donor countries that do provide budget 
support can simply alter the way in which they 
provide their assistance to help support the creation 
of sustainable revenue institutions, without altering 
the overall direction or magnitude of their aid flows. 
Consider the example of a donor country that has 
$100 million in a variety of projects and provides $0 
million in budget support, into a trust fund. rather 
than seek a tax exemption for their contractors, 
the donor could gross up the project to cover tax 
payments and reduce the amount of budget support 
by a corresponding amount. This is illustrated below. 
TOTAL ASSISTANCE TO RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT 
TREASURy wITH AND wITHOUT EXEMPTIONS
With 
 exemption
Without 
exemption
1. Projects executed 
by contractors
100 100
2. Tax liability 0 10
3. Budget support 30 20
4. Total contribution 
to recipient 
treasury (=2+3) 
30 30
5. Total amount 
of assistance
130 130
This could be operationalized quite simply. The 
donor agency would simply treat the payment of 
taxes by its contractors and their employees as an 
additional acquittable expense, in much the same 
way that travel or per diems are currently treated. 
When making claims for payment, contractors would 
include evidence of tax paid as part of their expense 
claims.19  In reporting their assistance to the oeCD 
Development assistance Committee, donors would 
break out tax paid for each project, report the net 
19/ If the proposals outlined above are implemented, care will need to be 
taken to ensure that firms cannot effectively “double dip” – by having their tax 
payments to the post-conflict revenue authority recognized as an acquittable 
expense and reimbursed, and then seeking credit for tax paid from the revenue 
authority in their home jurisdiction. This is an issue that could be addressed in 
the broad-ranging discussions envisaged under proposal 2.
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figure against the relevant sector, and then report all 
the tax paid by their contractors against the budget 
support category. 
again it should be stressed that this approach does 
not alter in any way the amount of assistance allocated 
to “development” projects – the main objection of 
those who argue for tax exemptions. nor does it alter 
the total amount of assistance provided, including 
budget support.  rather it alters the way that assistance 
is provided, to leverage additional benefits in building 
the institutions of state that will be needed for stable 
and sustainable governance. 
3. LAND TAXATION
The third proposal for revenue mobilization involves 
directly taxing an economic factor of production 
(land), rather than taxing economic activity or the 
use of that factor. This approach takes advantage of 
what is generally regarded as a liability, not an asset 
– the uncertainty around land tenure in post-conflict 
environments. 
post-conflict environments are characterized by 
reduced economic activity. Conflict means that 
current demand for goods and services is less certain, 
the infrastructure linking producers to market is 
uncertain, and the likelihood of being in a position to 
collect the returns tomorrow on investments made 
today is reduced.
a second characteristic of post-conflict environments 
is the depletion of many factors of production. 
Factors that are mobile are often moved out in 
order to generate economic returns elsewhere. The 
physical capital stock in a country in many cases has 
been degraded or destroyed by the conflict, while 
the financial capital has been invested in foreign 
markets to earn safer returns. skilled labor often has 
emigrated in order to earn safer returns, and because 
skilled laborers are both more likely to be persecuted 
in conflicts and are more likely to be welcomed by 
third countries. The stock of land on the other hand, 
is immobile. so one option to mobilize revenue in the 
short to medium term is to tax the ownership of land.  
PROPOSAL 5: INTRODUCE A TAX ON 
LAND HOLDING IN URbAN AREAS.
land taxation is an option that is rarely considered 
in the post-conflict environment, often because the 
tenure of the land is in dispute. Yet the disputed 
tenure actually represents a key asset in introducing a 
land taxation system. It is often difficult to introduce 
land taxation in established political systems because 
landowners are generally a wealthy and powerful 
interest group who are well-placed to protect their 
interests. When land tenure is disputed, the power 
of this interest group becomes more fractured and 
the opportunity to introduce the tax is heightened. 
people making claims on disputed land would do so 
understanding that a successful claim brings with it 
a tax liability. 
land taxation is an excellent way to raise revenue: it 
is relatively simple to administer, and relatively hard 
to evade. The tax could either be based on the value 
of the block of land, or more simply on the size of the 
block.  a land tax based on the size of the block would 
be very simple, transparent, and hard to evade – non-
payment could simply result in seizure of the land. 
The focus of any land taxation initiative should be on 
urban land rather than on all lands for two reasons. 
First,  focus on the urban areas will be driven by scarce 
administrative capacity. revenue offices already exist 
in major urban areas and the cadastral records will 
identify land parcels more easily – even if ownership 
is disputed. second, much of the rural land is used for 
subsistence agriculture. For reasons of both equity 
and potential revenue yield, the focus should be on 
urban land.  
CONCLUSION: TIME FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAkING
In a post-conflict environment, the domestic 
authorities face a twin challenge. They must try to 
mobilize increased domestic revenue and at the same 
time build a system that will allow the mobilization 
of adequate revenue on a sustainable basis into 
the future. There is pressure by the international 
community to increase revenue mobilization in 
the short term.  Yet this same international system 
engages in practices that exempt large portions 
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of economic activity from taxation, weaken the 
capacity of the nascent revenue administration to 
effectively do its job, and create incentives for the 
state to rely on external budget support rather than 
raise revenue domestically. 
The proposals outlined in this paper are designed 
to improve the practices of the international 
community and more effectively support the 
mobilization of domestic revenue. This can be 
done in three complementary ways: by providing 
matching funds for budget support purposes, 
strengthening instead of weakening the incentive 
for domestic revenue mobilization; by reconsidering 
the tax treatment of the international community,  so 
as to better tap the revenue potential in economic 
activity it generates while meeting the concerns of 
the international community; and by introducing 
taxation on urban lands.
possibly the most critical proposal is to convene a 
meeting of interested participants to consider the 
taxation treatment of the international community 
in the broader development context. This could 
be organized under the auspices of the oeCD’s 
Development assistance Committee (DaC), the new 
Un peacebuilding Commission, or the ImF.  a blanket 
approach to exemptions may have been appropriate 
in the environment in which international missions 
operated 60 years ago – but their application needs 
to be re-interpreted. In a calm environment, outside 
the hurly-burly of an individual post-conflict country, 
the detrimental impacts of tax exemptions can be 
considered and informed choices made to reach 
a consistent interpretation of these issues. If the 
international community collectively decides to 
continue to support large exemptions, then it would 
do so mindful of the negative consequences for 
domestic resource mobilization and statebuilding. 
In the course of these discussions, other proposals 
presented in this paper, including the topics of 
double-taxation agreements and recasting the 
way that budget support is administered, can be 
considered together. a package of options could 
then be put together that would strengthen the 
capacity of the revenue authority to do its job in 
raising the resources necessary to meet the most 
urgent spending needs of the society.   
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TAX EXEMPTIONS AND LIAbILITy OF DIFFERENT ORGANIzATIONS, THEIR CONTRACTORS AND THEIR EMPLOyEES:  
THE EXAMPLE OF kOSOVO
Organizations Contractors of organizations
Profit tax VAT on  
imports
Personal income tax on 
employees:
Profit tax VAT on 
imports
VAT paid 
internally
Personal income tax on 
contractor’s employees:
foreign           local foreign local
          
UNMIK, OSCE, UN agencies N/A Excluded Exempt Exempt Exempt Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
KFOR N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Taxable Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
World Bank / IMF N/A Excluded Exempt Exempt Taxable Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
Euro. Agency for Reconstruction N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Taxable Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
USAID N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Exempt Taxable Rebatable Liable Exempt Taxable
Country agreements N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable Exempt Exempt Rebatable Excluded Exempt Taxable
Liaison offices (including EC) N/A Excluded Exempt Taxable N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Taxable
NGOs Partly Rebatable Exempt Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
Provisional Government N/A Partly Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
Central Bank Exempt Liable Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
State-owned enterprises Exempt Partly Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
Private organizations Taxable Liable Taxable Taxable Taxable Taxable Liable Liable Taxable Taxable
source: Kosovo revenue authority. This is a simplified version of the actual table used by the Kra. The full table contains an additional five categories: presumptive tax on organizations, foreign firms, and local firms; 
VaT on internal supplies by organizations and VaT on supplies made by contractors of organizations to organizations.
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